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REVISING REASONABLENESS IN THE CLOUD 
Ian Walsh* 
Abstract: Save everything—just in case––and search for it later. This is a modern mantra 
fueled by the ubiquity of smartphones, laptops, tablets, and free or low-cost data storage that 
leads users to store massive amounts of data in the cloud. But when users trust third-party cloud 
storage providers with private communications, they also surrender Fourth Amendment 
constitutional certainty. Existing statutory safeguards for these communications are lower than 
Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause standards; this permits the government to seize 
large quantities of users’ private communications stored in the cloud with only minimal 
justification. Due to the revealing nature of such communications, the existing protections for 
them are insufficient under the Fourth Amendment. To prevent broad intrusions into users’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy, this Comment proposes an approach akin to Berger v. New 
York, where the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that allowed invasive real-time 
eavesdropping because the statute did not require sufficient particularization. Like in Berger, 
seizures of private communications in the cloud should require a warrant based on probable 
cause that is sufficiently particularized to protect against indiscriminate, large-scale data 
collection and roving searches by the government. 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 266 million people in the United States own 
smartphones—accounting for 81% of Americans.1 The United States 
Supreme Court has observed that modern cell phones store “a digital 
record of nearly every aspect of their [users’] lives—from the mundane to 
the intimate” and are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that 
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important 
feature of human anatomy.”2 
The convenience and ubiquity of modern devices result from 
technological developments that enable fast communication and high-
capacity storage, provided through online platforms run by third parties 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. Special thanks to Professor 
Mary Fan for her helpful guidance and insightful edits. I would also like to thank the entire 
Washington Law Review editorial staff for their invaluable assistance, especially Oliana Luke, Monica 
Romero, and Quynh La.  
1. The population of the United States was estimated to be 328,239,523 in 2019. Press Release, 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2019 U.S. Population Estimates Continue to Show the Nation’s Growth Is 
Slowing (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/popest-nation.html 
[https://perma.cc/TJ8K-N3CE]. Multiplying this population by estimated smartphone ownership of 
81% equals 265,874,013 people. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/8VSE-GMNZ]. 
2. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385, 395 (2014). 
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such as Apple and Google.3 Use of these platforms is colloquially known 
as storing data in “the cloud.”4 Users store much of the personal data from 
their smartphones and computers in the cloud.5 But when users share data 
with third-party cloud storage providers, they may surrender Fourth 
Amendment constitutional protection.6 
The Fourth Amendment safeguards people and their effects from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”7 The framers of the Constitution 
established this protection to repudiate the colonial-era English practice 
of using general warrants to conduct invasive and unjustified searches for 
evidence of possible wrongdoing.8 To limit the authority of officers, the 
Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be founded on probable cause 
and describe with particularity both the “place to be searched” and the 
“persons or things to be seized.”9 
However, the Fourth Amendment’s reach has been limited when 
information is disclosed to third parties.10 This is significant because 
modern devices rely on third-party cloud platforms for data storage.11 
Smartphones use cloud storage for a variety of features, including backing 
up important data.12 Computers also often incorporate cloud platforms 
such as OneDrive, Google Drive, and Dropbox to provide convenient 
cross-device access.13 The integration of these platforms with a wide array 
of devices means that users both wittingly and unwittingly store data with 
vast depth and breadth in the cloud.14 
Given the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, the primary protection 
for private communications stored in the cloud is a statute called the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA).15 The SCA was enacted in 1986—
 
3. See infra Part I. 
4. See What Is the Cloud?, MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-
is-the-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/UT4C-NGCJ] (“Instead of accessing files and data from a local or 
personal computer, you are accessing them online from any Internet-capable device—the information 
will be available anywhere you go and anytime you need it.”). 
5. See infra section I.B.  
6. See infra section II.B. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
8. See infra section II.A. 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra section II.A. 
10. See infra section II.B. 
11. See infra section I.B. 
12. See infra section I.B. 
13. See infra section I.B. 
14. See infra section I.B. 
15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13. The statute was first enacted as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
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over thirty years ago—and permits the government to obtain information 
stored in the cloud using standards that fall below Fourth Amendment 
baselines.16 In the context of private communications stored in the cloud, 
these lower standards conflict with the framers’ abhorrence of 
unreasonable general warrant searches and seizures that motivated the 
Fourth Amendment’s adoption.17 
What constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure changes as 
technology progresses.18 Over the past twenty years alone, the Supreme 
Court has addressed the privacy impacts from thermal imaging of homes, 
searches of phones incident to arrest, and cell site location data.19 In 1967, 
the Court confronted the then-modern technological innovation of real-
time wiretapping in Berger v. New York.20 This decision recognized that 
the privacy invasion from real-time eavesdropping on telephone 
conversations through wiretapping, if left unchecked, would be the 
functional equivalent of general warrant searches.21 The Court was 
especially concerned because the New York statute that authorized 
eavesdropping did not require a warrant or sufficient particularization and 
instead gave officers “a roving commission to ‘seize’ any and all” 
communications.22 To prevent invasive general-warrant-like seizures, the 
Court required a warrant—based on probable cause—and “precise and 
discriminate” particularization procedures.23 
Today, Americans face a privacy threat akin to wiretapping in the form 
of government searches and seizures of private communications stored in 
the cloud. To effectively safeguard a reasonable expectation of privacy 
for Americans, this Comment proposes a Berger-like Fourth Amendment 
approach.24 A warrant that is supported by probable cause should be 
 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). It has been 
referred to by various names, including “Chapter 121” and “Title II”; for simplicity, this Comment 
refers to this statute as the “Stored Communications Act” or “SCA.” See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide 
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1208, 1208 n.1 (2004). 
16. See infra section II.C. 
17. See infra section I.B; infra Part IV. 
18. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment to “assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
19. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (thermal imaging); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02 
(2014) (cell phones incident to arrest); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (cell site location information). 
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
21. See id. at 59. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 58–59. 
24. See infra Part IV. 
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required.25 Additionally, because of the broad scope of the intrusion and 
the highly revealing nature of information stored in the cloud, the warrant 
should be subject to “precise and discriminate” enhanced particularization 
requirements that minimize the scope of the seizure.26 This enhanced 
particularization heeds the repeated call of the Supreme Court to “assure[] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”27 Like with Berger, Congress 
should recognize technology’s power to undermine privacy and enact a 
comprehensive statute that exceeds this constitutional baseline.28 
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines how modern 
technological advances have impacted the invasiveness of searching and 
seizing communications from cloud storage platforms.29 Part II evaluates 
the existing protections from such seizures, both constitutionally and 
statutorily, and explains some of their limitations.30 Part III explores how 
the Supreme Court has confronted various intrusive technological 
advancements in the past.31 Part IV then proposes a Berger-like approach 
to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud that should be 
a constitutional backstop to any new statutory framework.32 
I. TECHNOLOGY ENCOURAGES USERS TO STORE VAST 
AMOUNTS OF DATA IN THE CLOUD 
Most people in the United States own a smartphone that depends on 
software made by either Apple or Google.33 Both companies provide 
built-in online storage platforms for these devices that encourage users to 
store important and highly personal information in the cloud.34 The 
 
25. See infra section IV.A. 
26. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58–59; infra section IV.B. 
27. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); infra Part IV. 
28. See infra section IV.C. 
29. See infra Part I. 
30. See infra Part II. 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
33. In December 2019, Apple’s operating system, iOS, accounted for an estimated 55.55% of the 
mobile operating system market share in the United States. See Mobile Operating System Market 
Share United States of America: Jan–Dec 2019, STATCOUNTER GLOB. STATS (Dec. 2019), 
https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america/2019 
[https://perma.cc/3LMW-T9WZ]. Google’s operating system, Android, accounted for an estimated 
44.29%. See id. Together, the two operating systems accounted for an estimated 99.84% of the mobile 
operating system market share in the United States. See id. 
34. See iCloud: The Best Place for All Your Photos, Files, and More, APPLE, 
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impressive capabilities provided by these platforms are possible because 
of developments in electronic storage and network technology, which 
have both undergone massive advancements in the last forty years.35 
Cloud storage platforms have fundamentally changed how people interact 
with technology: instead of storing a limited amount of data locally and 
deleting it from online storage quickly, people store vast amounts of data 
remotely in the cloud and keep it indefinitely.36 This key difference has 
made information stored in the cloud by most Americans “detailed, 
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”37 
A. Technological Advances Permit Massive Cloud Data Storage 
Forty years ago, data storage was expensive and had severe capacity 
limitations compared to today.38 Consider the 3.5-inch floppy disk from 
the 1980s, which could hold 1.44 megabytes of data.39 Compare that to 
the smallest storage size that Apple offers for their 2017 and newer 
iPhones, which is 64,000 megabytes—a 44,444-fold increase.40 To 
connect with devices in the cloud, Apple now offers 5,000 megabytes of 
free storage and subscriptions plans with up to 2,000,000 megabytes of 
capacity.41 Before Google launched their free email service in 2004, other 
email providers offered users about four megabytes of storage.42 Today, 
Google provides 15,000 megabytes of free storage in their online storage 
 
https://www.apple.com/icloud/ [https://perma.cc/S9XU-XXY2]; Back Up or Restore Data on Your 
Android Device, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/android/answer/2819582 
[https://perma.cc/6ZLR-3PJY]; Upload Files and Folders to Google Drive, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/drive/answer/2424368 [https://perma.cc/JF8U-9HJR]. 
35. See infra section I.A. 
36. See infra section I.B. 
37. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018); see infra section I.B. 
38. See R.J.T. Morris & B.J. Truskowsi, The Evolution of Storage Systems, 42 IBM SYS. J. 205, 
205–06 (2003). 
39. Steven Vaughan-Nichols, The History of the Floppy Disk, HEWLETT PACKARD ENTER. 
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.hpe.com/us/en/insights/articles/the-history-of-the-floppy-disk-
1703.html [https://perma.cc/V8KJ-8L4W]. 
40. See Identify Your iPhone Model, APPLE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT201296 [https://perma.cc/3HWL-UCER]. 64,000 megabytes (the smallest storage size of 2017 
and newer iPhones) divided by 1.44 megabytes (the storage size of 3.5-inch floppy disks) equals a 
44,444.4444-fold increase in capacity. 
41. See iCloud Storage Plans and Pricing, APPLE (Jan. 6, 2020), https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT201238 [https://perma.cc/KTA6-XFM2] (stating that users automatically receive five gigabytes 
of storage for free and can purchase subscriptions for up to two terabytes of storage). 
42. See Paul Festa, Google to Offer Gigabyte of Free Email, CNET (Apr. 1, 2004), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1o32-51828o5.html [https://perma.cc/WKH4-RGXA] (emphasizing that 
Google’s new email service would “dwarf those offerings” by offering 1,000 megabytes of storage). 
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platform, which includes email, files, phone backups, and more.43 Google 
also allows users to increase this capacity significantly with subscription 
plans that provide up to 30,000,000 megabytes of storage.44 
Massive storage capacity in the cloud is only effective if users can rely 
seamlessly on accessing their stored information. Internet speeds have 
increased dramatically in the last thirty years, enabling the proliferation 
of online storage providers.45 In 1994, internet-connected smartphones 
were unimaginable.46 For the few that had home internet access, the fastest 
speed was twenty-eight kilobits per second (kbps).47 Today, the median 
advertised home internet speed in the United States, including dial-up,48 
is 6,300 kbps—a 225-fold increase.49 Cellular wireless network 
technologies that were invented in the early 1990s advertised download 
speeds of up to 200 kbps.50 In 2010, cellular networks using more modern 
technology advertised average download speeds of between 5,000 and 
12,000 kbps with peaks up to 50,000 kbps—up to a 250-fold increase from 
the second-generation network.51 
B. Online Storage Platforms Facilitate Cloud Data Proliferation 
These technological advances have led to a significant shift in user 
behavior. Historically, messages sent on electronic communication 
platforms were saved to the user’s computer and deleted from remote 
storage in order to save space.52 This made sense, given capacity 
limitations at the time. However, users today no longer need to be as 
concerned about space constraints; instead of deleting data to save space, 
 
43. See Storage FAQ, GOOGLE, https://one.google.com/faq/storage [https://perma.cc/UK87-
5RGG] (noting that Google offers fifteen gigabytes of free storage). 
44. See Joe Maring, How to Buy More Google Drive Storage, ANDROID CENT. (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.androidcentral.com/how-buy-more-google-drive-storage [https://perma.cc/AC2A-
HFAN] (noting that Google offers paid subscriptions for up to thirty terabytes of storage). 
45. See U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 4, BROADBAND 
PERFORMANCE 11 (2010), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-300902A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R85A-8J9C]. 
46. See id. 
47. Id. 
48. Dial up is a method of connecting to the internet with exclusive use of a telephone line. Dial 
Up Internet Service, VERIZON WIRELESS, https://www.verizon.com/support/residential/ 
announcements/dial-up [https://perma.cc/TTZ7-FPGP]. Modern broadband connections are always 
on and use different technology than dial up. Id. 
49. See U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 45, at 11. 
50. Id. at 19. 
51. See id. 
52. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 
392–93 (2014). 
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users commonly save everything—just in case—and search for it later.53 
This new use pattern blurs the distinction between the privacy interests in 
real-time and stored information because it has become commonplace to 
store a deep record of digital communications that goes back months or 
even years. 
The breadth of private information stored in the cloud has similarly 
skyrocketed. Fast internet speeds and improved storage technology allow 
devices to “offer a range of tools for managing detailed information about 
all aspects of” their users’ lives.54 Apps can be used to store passwords, 
watch and record videos, send messages to friends, access bank accounts, 
track fitness, and read the news. As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
this “can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.”55 To preserve 
important data, Apple and Google provide backup services for their 
devices that store much of it in the cloud.56 These services generally 
encrypt57 the stored information, meaning it is somewhat protected from 
unauthorized access.58 However, the platforms themselves can usually 
access the encrypted data because they keep the decryption key.59 As such, 
cloud storage platforms generally can view much of this personal 
information—which can then potentially be seized and searched pursuant 
to a lawful order. 
 
53. See id. 
54. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014). 
55. Id. 
56. iCloud backup includes, inter alia, app data, device settings, text messages, photos, purchase 
history, and the user’s voicemail password. See What Does iCloud Back Up?, APPLE (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207428 [https://perma.cc/5LKB-FNAL]. Android backup 
includes, inter alia, contacts, text messages, wi-fi network passwords, app data, and phone settings. 
See Back Up or Restore Data on Your Android Device, supra note 34. 
57. Encrypted data cannot be viewed without using a decryption process that requires the right 
cryptographic private key. See What Is Encryption? | Types of Encryption, CLOUDFLARE, 
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-is-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/SD8V-BKQ4] (“A 
cryptographic key is a string of characters used within an encryption algorithm for altering data so 
that it appears random. Like a physical key, [a cryptographic key] locks (encrypts) data so that only 
someone with the right [private] key can unlock (decrypt) it.”). Using encryption prevents 
unauthorized parties who lack the right private key from accessing stored data. See id. 
58. See iCloud Security Overview, APPLE (Nov. 18, 2019), https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT202303 [https://perma.cc/M4MS-B78W]; Google and Android Have Your Back by Protecting 
Your Backups, GOOGLE SEC. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2018), https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-
and-android-have-your-back-by.html [https://perma.cc/T8X2-X5VP]. 
59. See iCloud Security Overview, supra note 58 (noting that iCloud backup does not use end-to-
end encryption for most data); Google and Android Have Your Back by Protecting Your Backups, 
supra note 58 (stating that the newest Android version has an end-to-end encrypted backup feature 
and that previous versions do not). End-to-end encryption prevents anyone besides the recipient at the 
other end (who has the right private key) from accessing transmitted data. See What Is End-to-End 
Encryption and How Does It Work?, PROTONMAIL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://protonmail.com/blog/what-
is-end-to-end-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/RQ6F-XHGE]. 
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Both commentators and courts have recognized that the use of modern 
smartphones and cloud storage platforms have led to paradigm shifts in 
both the depth and breadth of stored information.60 A deep historical 
record is created by people constantly carrying internet-connected devices 
and storing functionally everything going back years. This record contains 
a broad array of revealing personal information about all aspects of users’ 
lives. The Supreme Court has expressed concern when technology reveals 
“an individual’s private interests or concerns” along with their “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”61 The Court has 
also noted that some data stored in the cloud may not be shared with online 
storage providers in a truly voluntary manner: “Cell phone users often 
may not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in 
the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.”62 
Although smartphones illustrate the revealing nature of data stored in 
the cloud, they are by no means fully responsible for the proliferation of 
cloud storage use. Companies offer a vast array of non-smartphone-
specific cloud storage options, such as OneDrive,63 Google Drive,64 and 
Dropbox.65 Adobe provides cloud storage for artists’ photos and videos as 
part of their popular Creative Cloud service.66 People even purchase home 
security cameras with microphones that store all of their footage in the 
 
60. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 393; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014); Carpenter v. 
United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).  
61. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395–96 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)); Kerr, 
supra note 52, at 393. 
62. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 397. “From the user’s perspective, the data that is stored on the phone 
and the data that is stored in the cloud and available on the phone are often indistinguishable. App 
data is continuously updated in order to ensure that the data is synchronized across all the users’ 
devices [even when the user does not have the apps open].” Brief of Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC) et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 
(2014) (No. 13-132), 2014 WL 975497.  
63. See OneDrive, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/onedrive/online-
cloud-storage [https://perma.cc/GX53-6D6F] (“Save your files and photos to OneDrive and access 
them from any device, anywhere.”). 
64. See Google Drive, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/drive/ [https://perma.cc/6FP6-
CTWC] (“Easy and secure access to all of your content[:] Store, share, and collaborate on files and 
folders from any mobile device, tablet, or computer.”). 
65. See Dropbox Basic: Get a Dropbox Free Account, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/basic 
[https://perma.cc/ZAU7-SMRM] (“With Dropbox Basic, it’s easy to get to your files from multiple 
devices—computers, phones, and tablets—for free.”). 
66. See Adobe Creative Cloud, ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/creativecloud.html 
[https://perma.cc/X33X-R68N] (“[T]he world’s best creative apps and services so you can make 
anything you can imagine, wherever you’re inspired.”); Find Out How Much Storage You Have, 
ADOBE, https://helpx.adobe.com/creative-cloud/kb/file-storage-quota.html [https://perma.cc/XJM8-
2ZU5] (“Your Creative Cloud membership comes with cloud storage.”). 
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cloud.67 Given the depth and breadth of data stored in the cloud, allowing 
unrestrained government intrusions potentially exposes even more than 
the most exhaustive search of a house—which is afforded strong Fourth 
Amendment protections against government intrusion.68 
II. EXISTING PROTECTIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
STORED IN THE CLOUD ARE LIMITED 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures 
and imposes specific warrant requirements to prevent a “general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”69 These protections 
were motivated by invasive and arbitrary general warrant searches and 
seizures in England and the American colonies.70 However, existing 
doctrine limits the Fourth Amendment’s reach in the context of data stored 
by third parties.71 Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the SCA in 
1986 to provide some protection, but its statutory safeguards fall below 
the Fourth Amendment baseline and were designed for the computer 
network of the past.72 Courts have begun to recognize the privacy 
implications of modern technology use; in many circumstances, courts 
now require warrants notwithstanding lesser statutory standards.73 Still, 
even when the government obtains a warrant, inconsistent approaches to 
the particularity requirements for electronic searches lead to widely varied 
 
67. See How Nest Cameras Store Your Recorded Video, GOOGLE NEST HELP, 
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9242083 [https://perma.cc/B8S7-HQFF] (“A Google 
Nest camera doesn’t use memory cards to store your video on the camera. Instead, it uploads your 
video continuously to the cloud.”). 
68. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment 
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house . . . .’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
590 (1980))). 
69. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
70. See infra section II.A. 
71. See infra section II.B. 
72. See infra section II.C; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if 
the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the . . . information sought, [is] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”); OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS 
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 127–34 (2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6SRA-WERW] (noting that § 2703(d) orders instead of warrants can compel 
disclosure of the contents of electronic communications in some circumstances). Professor Orin Kerr 
articulated a similar argument in 2004. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1209–13. However, developments 
in Fourth Amendment law have led Professor Kerr to suggest that the content of communications 
such as email may receive constitutional protection. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 399–400.  
73. See infra section II.C. 
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levels of judicial oversight.74 
A. Foundational Fourth Amendment Principles 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government 
officials.”75 This has been clear since its adoption—its protections were 
motivated by arbitrary and unreasonable privacy invasions by the 
British.76 In England during the late 1400s and early 1500s, the British 
used “general warrants” to conduct unjustified searches “wherever it shall 
please them.”77 The invasiveness of searches worsened in the early 1600s 
with the creation of “writs of assistance” that expanded the scope of 
general-warrant searches.78 These searches were “abhorred by the 
[American] colonists.”79 During the first judicial challenge to the writs in 
the American colonies, the lawyer arguing against the practice gave an 
influential oratory that, according to John Adams, “breathed into this 
nation the breath of life.”80 Although the challenge failed,81 the Supreme 
Court has characterized the lawyer’s oratory “as perhaps the most 
prominent event” inaugurating the resistance of the colonies.82 The Court 
has also stated it is “familiar history” that such searches and seizures 
“were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment.”83 
To prevent unbridled authority in conducting invasive intrusions, the 
Fourth Amendment safeguards “persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government.84 Under 
Katz v. United States85 and its progeny, government action is a search 
under the Fourth Amendment if it violates a person’s “reasonable 
 
74. See infra section II.D. 
75. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. 
Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). 
76. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20–21 (1966); 
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965). 
77. LANDYNSKI, supra note 76, at 21 (citing 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY 
OF STATIONERS OF LONDON, 1554–1640, A.D., at xxxi (Edward Arber ed., 1875)). 
78. Id. at 22–23. 
79. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
80. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 59 (1970). 
81. Id. at 63. 
82. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). 
83. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
85. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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expectation of privacy.”86 This standard has two discrete components: 
(1) a person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and (2) that expectation must be “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”87 If either component is not satisfied, the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply.88 Katz explicitly rejected the 
prevailing interpretation that only property interests control; instead, the 
Court emphatically stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.”89 
Once government action implicates the Fourth Amendment, it is 
generally unreasonable in the absence of a valid warrant.90 The Fourth 
Amendment permits warrants to be issued only “upon probable cause” 
and requires that they “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, 
and the . . . things to be seized.”91 Probable cause is a “fluid concept”92 
that is satisfied when there is a reasonable basis to believe that an 
individual has committed a crime—a determination that is highly 
dependent on specific facts and circumstances.93 The dual “place” and 
“things” requirements for particularity are closely related and fact-
dependent; there must be probable cause that (1) the items will be found 
in the specified place, and (2) the specifically described items are 
connected with a crime.94 The warrant’s description must enable an officer 
to reasonably identify the items that are authorized to be seized and permit 
an issuing magistrate to determine whether the entire seizure is supported 
by probable cause.95 
 
86. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
87. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1978) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, 
J., concurring)). 
88. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.1(b) (6th ed. 2020). 
89. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
90. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“Our cases have determined that ‘[w]here a 
[Fourth Amendment] search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’” 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995))).  
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
92. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
93. United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986); State 
v. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d 538, 548–49, 834 P.2d 611, 616–17 (1992); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 88, 
§ 4.6(a). The specificity required for particularization depends greatly on individual facts and 
circumstances, including the crime and the items involved; often, “the sufficiency of a description of 
items to be seized . . . cannot be made by reference to earlier decisions passing upon precisely the 
same type of description.” Id. § 4.6(a). Instead, the description in each case must be evaluated in terms 
of the purposes that underlie the particularization requirement. Id. Warrants should describe the items 
to be seized as particularly as possible but use of generic categories does not necessarily invalidate a 
warrant if it is not possible to use a more precise description. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963. 
95. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963; 2 LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 4.6(a).  
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The Supreme Court has identified two distinct constitutional 
justifications for these requirements.96 First, there should be “a careful 
prior determination of necessity” because “any intrusion in the way of 
search or seizure is an evil.”97 Second, “searches deemed necessary should 
be as limited as possible” to prevent “a general, exploratory rummaging 
in a person’s belongings.”98 The authorization to search and seize should 
be limited to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause 
so that the government intrusion is carefully tailored to its justifications.99 
B. The Third-Party Doctrine Restricts the Fourth Amendment’s Reach 
Various caveats have emerged over time to these bedrock Fourth 
Amendment principles; among them—and crucial for data stored in the 
cloud—is the third party doctrine.100 Its roots can be traced to Katz, which 
clarified that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
[their] own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”101 In United States v. Miller,102 the Supreme Court relied in 
part on this language to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not apply 
to bank records, such as checks and deposit slips, because they were 
business records that were voluntarily disclosed to third parties.103 Three 
years later, in Smith v. Maryland,104 the Court adopted similar reasoning 
to find that pen registers, which were devices that recorded what phone 
numbers were dialed but not conversations, did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore did not require a warrant.105 
In the past, the Supreme Court also justified the third-party doctrine by 
 
96. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
97. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
98. Id. 
99. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
100. See infra notes 103–115 and accompanying text. Other caveats to these bedrock principles 
include the good faith exception, open fields, exigent circumstances, and community caretaking. See 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (good faith exception); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 88, 
§ 1.3(a) (good faith exception); id. § 2.4(a) (open fields); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181–
84 (1984) (open fields); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–53 (1984) (exigent circumstances); 
3 LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 6.1(f) (exigent circumstances); id. § 6.6(a) (community caretaking); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (community caretaking). 
101. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But importantly, “what [one] seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 
351–52. 
102. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
103. Id. at 442.  
104. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
105. Id. at 740–46. Phone numbers are voluntarily disclosed to third parties, but the conversations 
are not. See id. 
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reasoning that individuals assume the risk that another person might 
reveal their affairs to the government when they reveal their affairs to that 
third party.106 But subsequent developments in Fourth Amendment 
doctrine have clarified that the act of sharing is not itself determinative 
and people can still retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in data 
shared with a third party.107 
Courts, policymakers, and commentors analyzing Miller and Smith 
often identify a distinction between content and non-content.108 Content 
is information that conveys the substance or meaning of a communication, 
whereas non-content is information that does not.109 This distinction can 
be traced to postal mail letters, where the content of the letter itself is 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection but the non-content addressing 
information on the envelope is not.110 Similarly, the content of a phone 
conversation is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, but the phone 
number that is dialed (and revealed to third parties) is not.111 This principle 
can also apply to the cloud, with a distinction between the content of 
private communications and the non-content addressing or 
subscriber information. 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) accepted the distinction 
between content and non-content for data stored in the cloud but took the 
position that a warrant is not required to obtain either content or non-
content.112 With regard to non-content, such as subscriber information and 
transactions records, the DOJ suggested that the third-party doctrine 
precludes any reasonable expectation of privacy at all.113 With regard to 
content, for which users may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
the DOJ suggested that a “reasonable” subpoena may be used to compel 
production,114 which would be subject to a lower standard than a 
 
106. Id. at 740–44.  
107. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018); infra section III.B. 
108. See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text; infra section II.C; Matthew J. Tokson, The 
Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009) (“The 
content/noncontent distinction remains important in the constitutional and statutory law governing 
the inspection of private communications, even as new technologies have dramatically altered the 
nature of communication itself.”). 
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); Tokson, supra note 108, at 2112. 
110. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); Tokson, supra note 108, at 2112. 
111. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–46. 
112. OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 144–47 (stating that it is “well established that a 
customer or subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in [their non-content] subscriber 
information or transactional records” but “whether a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of communications . . . will depend on the facts and circumstances”). 
113. Id. at 144. 
114. Id. at 145. Subpoenas are used by a variety of government actors to compel production of 
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warrant.115 The DOJ’s view has recently been called into question, as 
discussed further below,116 but it parallels the statutory framework that 
protects information stored in the cloud today. 
C. Limited Statutory Protection from the Stored Communications Act 
In 1986, against the backdrop of the third-party doctrine’s limitations 
on constitutional protections, Congress enacted the SCA as a statutory 
framework to safeguard electronic communications stored by third-
parties.117 The SCA incorporated computer network use patterns at the 
time.118 Back then, online services had two main purposes.119 One purpose 
was email, which was generally stored online only until it was delivered 
to the user’s local machine.120 The other purpose was outsourcing 
computing tasks, such as storing files remotely and processing large 
amounts of data.121 To provide protection for these specific purposes, the 
SCA regulates electronic communication services (such as email) and 
remote computing services (such as remote file storage and data 
processing).122 Despite that technology use patterns today are 
fundamentally different than when the SCA was enacted over thirty years 
ago, this framework still applies to stored electronic communications. 
The SCA incorporated the distinction between content and non-
content, defining content as “any information concerning the substance, 
 
documents, including business and tax records. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 4.13. The recipient 
has an opportunity to challenge, or quash, the subpoena before producing the requested materials. Id. 
Protection against unreasonable subpoenas traditionally flows from the Fifth Amendment, but the 
Fourth Amendment is also implicated. Id. 
115. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1945); See v. City of Seattle, 
387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) (noting that a subpoena must be “sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in 
purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome”); 2 
LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 4.13(a). Unlike warrants, which are used to prove a pending charge, 
subpoenas are primarily used to discover evidence and ascertain the extent of wrongdoing to make a 
charge. See Subpoena Duces Tecum v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 247 (4th Cir. 2000). 
116. See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text. 
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13. 
118. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1213–14. 
119. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556–57. 
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1986). 
121. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3. 
122. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (electronic communication service defined as any service which 
provides its users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications); id. § 2510(17) 
(electronic storage is defined as any temporary or intermediate storage of such a communication or 
backup thereof); id. § 2711(2) (remote computing service defined as “the provision to the public of 
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system”); id. 
§ 2510(14) (defining electronic communications system). 
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purport, or meaning of that communication.”123 By its terms, the SCA 
permits the government to compel disclosure of non-content and almost 
all content held by cloud storage providers with a court order under 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) instead of a warrant.124 To obtain a 2703(d) order, the 
government must present “specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [information is] relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”125 This is a lower 
standard than probable cause and does not require any showing of 
wrongdoing by the user. The only type of information that requires a 
warrant supported by probable cause is unopened email that has been in 
storage for 180 days or less.126 In a concession to the reality of modern 
technology use, some courts have construed the warrant requirement to 
extend also to opened email in storage for 180 days or less.127 
The protections afforded by the SCA were understandable at the time 
it was enacted, considering the newly emerging third-party doctrine 
combined with slow network speeds and the lack of electronic storage 
capacity in the 1980s.128 However, due to seismic technological shifts, 
some justifications for its distinctions may no longer hold.129 For example, 
the distinction between unopened email stored less than 180 days (which 
requires a warrant under the SCA) and other remotely stored data (which 
does not) was only salient because, at the time, email was not stored by 
online providers for long periods of time.130 
Some courts have begun to recognize the implications of these 
technological shifts on Fourth Amendment doctrine and accordingly have 
required a warrant to access private communications. For example, in 
United States v. Warshak,131 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit found that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the content of emails stored by service providers.132 The court analogized 
 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); id. § 2711(1) (“[T]he terms defined in section 2510 of this title have, 
respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section . . . .”). 
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); id. § 2703(a)–(b) (compelled disclosure of content); id. § 2703(c) 
(compelled disclosure of non-content, including subscriber information, telephone connection 
records, and payment information); Kerr, supra note 15, at 1222–24. 
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
126. Id. § 2703(a). 
127. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e think that 
prior access is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage.”). 
128. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–46 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
741–46 (1979); Kerr, supra note 15, at 1213–18; supra Part I. 
129. See supra Part I. 
130. See supra Part I. 
131. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
132. Id. at 285–86. 
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email to postal mail, where the letter is content—entitled to full Fourth 
Amendment protection—and the addressing information is non-content 
that is not protected.133 “Given the fundamental similarities between email 
and traditional forms of communication, it would defy common sense to 
afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection.”134 Therefore, “to the 
extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such 
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”135 Other courts have 
adopted this approach,136 and many cloud storage providers already 
require a warrant to obtain private communications.137 However, the 
Supreme Court has not yet settled the matter. 
D. Inconsistent Approaches to the Warrant Particularity Requirement 
Even when the government uses a warrant to obtain private 
communications stored in the cloud, courts take a variety of inconsistent 
approaches to the warrant particularity requirement.138 In the context of 
physical electronic storage media, such as hard drives and USB sticks, 
sifting through large amounts of data at crime scenes to find information 
responsive139 to a warrant is fraught with challenges. According to DOJ, 
“it will be infeasible in almost every case” to search physical electronic 
media at the scene because evidence may be mislabeled, hidden, or 
otherwise “difficult to locate and retrieve without the appropriate tools 
and time.”140 Courts also recognize that searches and seizures of physical 




135. Id. at 288. 
136. See, e.g., In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email 
Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 
2012) (“The Court finds the rationale set forth in Warshak persuasive and therefore holds that an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails or faxes stored with, sent to, or received 
thorough an electronic communications service provider.”); United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 
39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012) (reasonable expectation of privacy in email). 
137. See Legal Process Guidelines: Government & Law Enforcement Within the United States, 
APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RY8S-V5BC]; How Google Handles Government Requests for User Information, 
GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms/information-requests [https://perma.cc/WF7X-X75Y]; 
About Our Practices and Your Data, MICROSOFT, https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/our-practices 
[https://perma.cc/9ZAV-UVYN]. 
138. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2); infra notes 147–163 and accompanying text. 
139. Responsive information corresponds with the particularized terms of the warrant; conversely, 
items that are outside the scope of the warrant’s terms are nonresponsive. See United States v. Ganias, 
824 F.3d 199, 210 n.23 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Aboshady, 297 F. Supp. 3d 232, 236 (D. 
Mass. 2018). 
140. OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 76–77. 
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throughout, making extraction and segregation of responsive data from 
nonresponsive data potentially impossible without retaining the media 
itself (or an exact copy).141 Even attempting to search physical electronic 
media at the scene risks damaging evidence because simply using the 
media might alter the stored data.142 Furthermore, seizures of physical 
electronic media may be necessary for the government to establish the 
authenticity and integrity of evidence at trial, and for the defendant to 
challenge evidence through an independent forensic analysis.143 
To address these challenges, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(e)(2) authorizes a two-step process for searches and 
seizures of electronically stored data.144 The process begins with an initial 
broader seizure of the physical electronic storage media, or the copying of 
the data stored on it.145 Then, once the media is seized, the government 
can subsequently search it at a later date to identify information that is 
responsive to the warrant’s narrower subject matter restrictions.146 
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz147 illustrates a deferential approach to 
this Rule applied to seizures of private communications stored in the 
cloud. The warrant issued in Pinto-Thomaz required production of data 
stored in an Apple iCloud account that was associated with Pinto-
Thomaz’s email address.148 It demanded that Apple produce messages, 
images, videos, files, documents, address book information, subscriber 
and payment information, transaction records, Find My iPhone device 
location connection logs, service information, along with “[a]ll records 
and other information stored by the . . . user.”149 Instead of imposing 
specific restrictions on the initial seizure from the service provider, the 
warrant allowed the government to look through this vast quantity of 
seized data to identify what might fall under the warrant’s more narrowly 
 
141. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 212–14. 
142. See id. at 212 n.28; OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 77–78. Computers continually 
read from and write to the hard disk, which changes some of the information recorded there. OFF. OF 
LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 77–78. Furthermore, if a device is connected to the internet, 
“someone at a remote location might be able to access the computer and delete data while 
investigators are examining it on-site.” Id. at 77–78. 
143. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 215–16. But see id. at 215 n.33 (“We do not suggest that 
authentication of evidence from computerized records is impossible absent retention of an entire hard 
drive or mirror.”). 
144. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
148. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pretrial Motions at Ex. D, 
Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (No. S2 18-Cr.-579 (JSR)). 
149. Id. 
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particularized subject-matter limitations.150 
The warrant included an explicit time limit on how old the messages in 
the initial seizure could be but it did not specify such a limit for any other 
categories of requested data.151 Even with these open-ended parameters, 
the Pinto-Thomaz court found that the warrant was not facially overbroad 
because “a temporal limitation is not an absolute necessity.”152 
Notwithstanding the invasive nature of the initial seizure, the court held 
that the more narrowly particularized subject matter limitations on the 
subsequent search effectively limited the time frame concerned.153 
However, those limitations were not clear to the FBI agent who searched 
the materials, leading the agent to review materials that fell outside the 
warrant’s limitations on the subsequent search.154 
The government regularly applies for warrants that demand a vast array 
of information from cloud storage providers. For example, a narcotics 
investigator requested the authority to seize all content155 from an Apple 
iCloud account.156 According to the agent’s affidavit, it was necessary to 
copy the entire contents of the account to minimize interference with the 
cloud storage provider’s business activities, protect privacy of other users, 
and “effectively pursue this investigation.”157 Other examples include a 
firearms trafficking investigator and a postal inspector who both requested 
the authority to seize, among other things, “[t]he contents of all files and 
other records stored on iCloud.”158 While each application also contained 
 
150. See United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 357 F. Supp. 3d 324, 329–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
151. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pretrial Motions, supra 
note 148, at Ex. D. Perhaps surprisingly, not even “[a]ll records and other information stored by the 
Subject Account’s user” had an explicit time limitation. Id. 
152. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 306 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, No. 09-cr-625, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 719, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010)). 
153. Id. at 306–07. 
154. Pinto-Thomaz, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 330. Even after these violations, the court found “no ground 
for imposing the ‘extreme remedy’ of blanket suppression” because the agent did not “grossly exceed” 
the warrant’s terms, which “generally authorized widespread seizure of a number of broadly defined 
categories of evidence.” Id. at 331. 
155. The agent did not appear to be making a distinction between content and non-content. See 
Application for a Search Warrant at Attach. B, In re the Search of Apple, Inc., No. 19MJ5303 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Search Warrant Application for cmdlc92@icloud.com] (requesting 
subscriber information, billing records, electronic mail, files, cloud storage, location information, 
and more). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 16. The agent did not provide any citations for these assertions. See id. 
158. Application for a Search Warrant at Attach. B, In re the Search of Info. Associated with the 
Apple ID & iCloud Account grindfamily1@gmail.com that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple 
Inc., No. 19-968M(NJ) (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Search Warrant Application for 
grindfamily1@gmail.com] (firearms trafficking investigator); Application for a Search Warrant at 24, 
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an enumerated list of items to obtain, the provisions above seem to make 
such a list somewhat superfluous because the scope of the requested 
seizure was, in effect, all information associated with the cloud storage 
provider accounts.159 
Not all courts endorse such a deferential approach to the 
particularization of the initial seizure. For example, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit suggested that warrants for 
broad categories of data might be invalid under the Fourth Amendment 
because “[t]hey require[] disclosure to the government of virtually every 
kind of data that could be found in a social media account.”160 As such, 
they should have been limited to communications between specific 
persons and during specific periods.161 Some courts have gone even 
further and suggested that cloud storage providers filter the requested 
information using specifically designated search parameters before 
providing it to the government.162 However, other courts have rejected this 
approach, in part because incidental exposure to some nonresponsive 
information is unavoidable even with searches of physical items.163 This 
variation in approach by jurisdiction, with many adopting a deferential 
approach, fails to provide consistent protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures of private communications stored in the cloud. 
 
In re the Search of Info. Associated with peter_burno@icloud.com that Is Stored at Premises 
Controlled by Apple, Inc, No. 3:19-MJ-00578-MMS (D. Alaska Nov. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Search 
Warrant Application for peter_burno@icloud.com] (postal inspector).  
159. See Search Warrant Application for grindfamily1@gmail.com, supra note 158, at Attach. B; 
Search Warrant Application for peter_burno@icloud.com, supra note 158, at 23–26; Search Warrant 
Application for cmdlc92@icloud.com, supra note 155, at Attach. B. 
160. United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 974 (11th Cir. 2017). 
161. Id. However, regardless of any potential Fourth Amendment violation, the court found that 
the obtained evidence should not be excluded due to the good-faith exception. Id. 
162. See In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that Is Stored at Premises 
Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2014); In re the Search of Info. Associated 
with [redacted]@mac.com That is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 
153–55 (D.D.C.), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 168 (D.D.C. 2014). 
163. See In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that Is Stored at Premises 
Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 166 (D.D.C. 2014); United States v. Taylor, 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 230, 237 (D. Me. 2011) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require the government to 
delegate a prescreening function to the internet service provider or to ascertain which e-mails are 
relevant before copies are obtained from the internet service provider for subsequent searching.”); 
United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Nor does the Fourth Amendment 
require the executing authorities to delegate a pre-screening function to the internet service provider 
or to ascertain which e-mails are relevant before copies are obtained from the internet service provider 
for subsequent searching.”). 
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III. PAST UNREASONABLE SEIZURES ENABLED BY 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that technology has the 
potential to increase the government’s power to conduct invasive and 
unjustified seizures.164 When confronted with such technology, the Court 
has expanded Fourth Amendment protection to “assure[] preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.”165 One of those moments occurred when the 
Court confronted invasive real-time telephone wiretapping, recognizing 
its similarity to general warrants of the past.166 More recently, the Court 
has reevaluated existing Fourth Amendment doctrine to maintain 
protection for data that, due to its depth and breadth, has the potential to 
be highly revealing.167 
A. Berger: Real-Time Wiretapping Recognized as Invasive 
In 1967, the Supreme Court confronted real-time eavesdropping 
through wiretapping, a then-modern technology that could enable highly 
invasive searches and seizures of private communications.168 At the time, 
a New York statute authorized judicial wiretap orders that were founded 
on a “reasonable ground to believe that evidence of a crime may be thus 
obtained,” not probable cause.169 The statute also required that orders state 
their duration, with a maximum of two months (unless extended), the 
telephone line (if relevant), and a particular description of “the person or 
persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be 
overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof.”170 An order could be 
extended if it was “in the public interest”—a vague standard that did not 
clearly require a new showing of probable cause.171 
After examining the invasiveness of the seizure, the Court first 
emphasized that a warrant based on probable cause is required under the 
Fourth Amendment.172 Although some New York cases suggested that the 
 
164. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
165. Id. 
166. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967). 
167. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (cell phones incident to arrest); Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 2217 (cell site location information). 
168. Berger, 388 U.S. at 46–47. 
169. Id. at 43 n.1. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 59. 
172. Id. at 55 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
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statute’s “reasonable ground” requirement was equivalent, the Court 
decided it “need not pursue the question further” because “the statute is 
deficient on its face in other respects.”173 
Specifically, the Court found that the statute did not satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant particularization requirement.174 While it did 
require identification of the “persons whose communications . . . are to be 
overheard,” the statute did not require particularity as to the specific crime 
that was committed, the specific place to be searched, or the specific 
communications to be seized.175 As such, the statute lacked the necessary 
“precise and discriminate requirements” and instead authorized 
“indiscriminate use” of wiretapping.176 The Court also found that “[t]he 
need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing 
required . . . is especially great in the case of eavesdropping” because 
“[b]y its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that 
is broad in scope.”177 The New York statute also impermissibly sanctioned 
“long and continuous” eavesdropping that allowed officers to seize 
communications “indiscriminately and without regard to their connection 
with the crime under investigation.”178 The Court found that the statute 
was unconstitutional because it authorized invasive general-warrant 
searches that the Fourth Amendment was specifically intended 
to prevent.179 
Just one year after Berger, Congress enacted Title III to regulate real-
time wiretapping.180 This new statute was designed to meet and build on 
Berger’s requirements.181 Along with an explicit warrant requirement, 




175. Id. at 58–59. 
176. Id. at 58. 
177. Id. at 56. 
178. Id. at 59. The Court also required a showing of “present probable cause” instead of only 
relying on the original grounds in the initial order. Id. 
179. Id. at 58. 
180. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also Susan Freiwald, Online 
Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 21–23 (2004). 
“Commentators use either ‘Title III’ or the ‘Wiretap Act’ to refer to the law.” Freiwald, supra, at 
13 n.22. 
181. Freiwald, supra note 180, at 24 (“When Congress passed the Wiretap Act in 1968, it benefited 
from the Supreme Court’s recent guidance.”). 
182. Title III mandates that every wiretap order and extension “contain a provision that the 
authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way 
as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this 
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extensive involvement of a judicial officer, and even prohibits 
wiretapping until conventional techniques have failed.183 At least one 
commentator has called a Title III judicial order for wiretapping a “super-
warrant.”184 The statutory provisions in Title III provide even stronger 
privacy protections than those required in Berger and demonstrate that 
legislation can create an effective statutory framework that exceeds a 
constitutional baseline. 
B. Riley and Carpenter: Highly Revealing Nature of Stored Data 
Leads to Revised Fourth Amendment Doctrines 
The Supreme Court has recently re-examined existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrines in the context of highly revealing searches and 
seizures but has not yet considered the Fourth Amendment protections for 
private communications stored in the cloud. First, in Riley v. California,185 
the Court narrowed the authority for officers to search the contents of cell 
phones seized incident to a lawful arrest. The Court explicitly rejected the 
argument that searching data stored directly on a cell phone is 
indistinguishable from searches of physical containers.186 Instead, the 
Court found that “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s 
person.”187 Given their immense storage capacity and propensity to collect 
many distinct types of information, cell phones store a deep record of 
users’ everyday lives.188 Furthermore, the breadth of data collected—
including location information, messages, a plethora of apps, browsing 
data, and search history—“can form a revealing montage of the user’s 
life.”189 These factors led the Court to require a warrant prior to searching 
a cell phone, even incident to arrest.190 
Four years later, in Carpenter v. United States,191 the Court confronted 
 
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days. 
In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that 
foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may 
be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
183. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802; Freiwald, supra note 180, at 25. 
184. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 630 (2003). 
185. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
186. Id. at 392–93. 
187. Id. at 393. 
188. Id. at 393–94. 
189. Id. at 396. 
190. Id. at 401. 
191. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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the warrantless acquisition of cell phone users’ stored location 
information under the SCA.192 Cell phones connect to towers near their 
users for communication, and cellular providers store these time-stamped 
records of their customers’ approximate locations over time; these records 
are called cell-site location information (CSLI).193 Although wireless 
providers collect and store these records for their own business 
purposes,194 CSLI also “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”195 
Furthermore, because cell phones are “indispensable to participation in 
modern society” and “[v]irtually any activity on the phone generates 
CSLI,” users do not “voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a 
comprehensive dossier of [their] physical movements.”196 
Even though CSLI arguably consists of business records held by a third 
party, the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the 
collection of CSLI and instead required a warrant.197 In Carpenter, the 
Court made it clear that “the fact that the information is held by a third 
party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”198 The Court also noted that it “has never held that the 
Government may subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”199 Taken together, Riley and 
Carpenter suggest that, when technology enables the depth and breadth 
of stored data to become sufficiently “detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled,”200 courts should evaluate such impacts to protect 
users’ reasonable expectation of privacy. 
IV. PROTECTING A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD 
It is paramount to recognize when technology enables the government 
to conduct searches and seizures that are akin to general warrant searches 
 
192. Id. at 2212–13. 
193. See id. at 2211–12. 
194. Id. at 2212. 
195. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)). 
196. Id. at 2220 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). 
197. Id. Although the Court required a warrant for seven days of CSLI, it left open the possibility 
that accessing a more “limited period” of CSLI might survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 
2217 n.3. 
198. Id. at 2217. 
199. Id. at 2221. 
200. See id. at 2216. 
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the framers intended to prohibit, especially in light of the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment—to prevent officers from having unbridled discretion 
to perform unreasonable government intrusions. As with real-time 
wiretapping in Berger, seizing private communications stored in the cloud 
without sufficient safeguards is akin to an invasive general warrant search. 
To provide sufficient safeguards, courts should consider the fundamental 
privacy implications of seizing what is often years’ worth of revealing 
private communications stored in the cloud and adopt Fourth Amendment 
doctrine to prevent such invasive and unreasonable seizures. 
A. Seizures of Private Communications in the Cloud Should Require a 
Warrant and Probable Cause 
A warrant should be required to obtain private communications stored 
in the cloud due to the highly invasive nature of such seizures. Users often 
store years of wide-ranging private communications in the cloud.201 
Seizures of such communications “form a revealing montage of the user’s 
life,”202 and cloud storage platforms have become functionally 
“indispensable to participation in modern society,”203 akin to 
smartphones. When users store intimate information in the cloud, 
including video and audio recordings from inside their homes,204 it seems 
clear they possess a subjective expectation of privacy in those stored 
communications. Additionally, given the ubiquity of online storage 
platforms today and their intimate interdependence with modern 
devices,205 society appears to recognize this expectation as reasonable.206 
Berger supports these conclusions—it made clear that obtaining 
functionally every communication a person had over an extended period 
of time required a warrant supported by probable cause.207 Although the 
threat then was real-time wiretapping, the government today can obtain 
years’ worth of messages that a user sends and receives, location history, 
photos, videos, phone backups, and more from the cloud.208 Furthermore, 
the Court underscored in Carpenter that users can retain a reasonable 
 
201. See supra section I.B. 
202. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014); see also supra section I.B. 
203. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see also supra section I.B. 
204. See supra section I.B. 
205. See supra section I.B. 
206. Prominent cloud storage providers like Apple, Google, and Microsoft seem to agree that the 
Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant for private communications stored 
in the cloud. See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (warrant based on probable cause 
required to obtain user content stored in the cloud). 
207. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55–59 (1967); supra section III.A. 
208. See supra notes 122–163 and accompanying text; supra section I.B. 
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expectation of privacy in data stored with a third party if that data are 
sufficiently revealing and the technology is indispensable.209 Accordingly, 
courts should recognize the necessity for a warrant requirement to obtain 
private communications stored in the cloud and invalidate the SCA to the 
extent that it allows access to such data without a warrant and with a lower 
standard than probable cause. 
B. Berger-like Enhanced Particularity Requirements Should Apply 
Given the inconsistent approaches to the particularity requirement for 
electronic searches and seizures, a warrant is necessary but not sufficient 
to safeguard private communications stored in the cloud. Courts should 
recognize, as in Berger, that “[t]he need for particularity and evidence of 
reliability in the showing required . . . is especially great” for 
communications held in the cloud because such seizures involve “an 
intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope.”210 Furthermore, as the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, it is crucial to 
engage with the technological specifics.211 With these considerations in 
mind, courts should balance users’ privacy interests with officers’ 
legitimate need to find evidence of wrongdoing—as long as there is 
probable cause. 
Under this approach, a warrant that authorizes the initial seizure of all 
information stored by the user212 of a cloud storage provider account 
would by facially invalid due to the lack of particularization. Instead, the 
government should be required to particularize the warrant to the extent it 
can do so without requiring the platform to comb through the content of 
users’ private communications. A government mandate that forces cloud 
storage providers to build highly specialized systems and hire staff to 
comb through the content of user data would have privacy implications 
for other users and interfere with the provider’s business activities.213 
Temporal limitations, such as “all messages sent and received between 
these dates,” should be required because they do not require any 
knowledge of the content of communications. In addition, warrants should 
particularly describe the type of content requested and show the probable 
cause that supports such a request. Communications stored in the cloud 
 
209. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018); see also supra 
notes 192–200 and accompanying text. 
210. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 56; supra section I.B. 
211. United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 217 (2d Cir. 2016). 
212. See supra notes 147–154 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 155–157 and accompanying text; Bihter Ozedirne, Note, Fourth Amendment 
Particularity in the Cloud, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1223, 1239–40 (2018). 
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can take a wide variety of forms, including text messages, email, photos, 
videos, files, browsing history, phone backups, and more.214 If the 
government has information that suggests two individuals used a cloud 
storage account to contact each other in furtherance of a crime during a 
specified time period, that would support probable cause for the 
government to seize any messages between those individuals during the 
specified period. But, standing alone, that information should not be 
sufficient to support probable cause permitting the government to also 
seize photos or browsing history from that same period. 
Particularization of this sort is possible because the government can 
request specific categories of information from the cloud storage 
provider.215 This makes searches in the cloud materially different from 
searches of physical electronic storage media: there is no scene of the 
crime, so to speak, and no need for the government to conduct a forensic 
analysis of the raw storage media to discover evidence. Furthermore, 
probable cause can be more specifically associated with the categories of 
data that are initially seized. Thus, the traditional justifications for 
allowing unrestrained initial seizures of physical electronic storage 
media216 apply with less force, and the intermediary role of the provider 
should generally permit reasonable limits on the initial seizure. 
C. Compatible Statutory Protections Should Provide Future 
Comprehensive Framework 
The proposed safeguards in this Comment are designed as a 
constitutional baseline, not a comprehensive regulatory framework. Like 
with Berger and Title III, Congress should build off this constitutional 
approach and enact revised statutory protections.217 Ideally, these 
protections would go beyond the baseline to protect users’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy while still addressing the government’s legitimate 
interest in investigating wrongdoing. For example, akin to Title III, 
Congress could permit the acquisition of private communications stored 
in the cloud only for a specific list of enumerated offenses, require that 
traditional investigatory techniques be tried first and fail, or require notice 
 
214. See supra section I.B. 
215. See Legal Process Guidelines, supra note 137 (specifying twenty-three different categories of 
available information and asking that government requests “be as narrow and specific as possible”); 
Requests for User Information FAQs, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
answer/9713961 [https://perma.cc/63MG-77D5] (specifying a variety of types of available 
information depending on the relevant Google services). 
216. See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
217. See Freiwald, supra note 180, at 24–26. 
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to targets of the investigation.218 Congress could also mandate specific 
minimization requirements, such as a presumptive maximum temporal 
limit for the acquisition of private communications that could only be 
overcome with a heightened showing in specified circumstances. 
Regardless, any statutory safeguards should mandate the extensive 
involvement of the court in the entire process. 
CONCLUSION 
Although users store a vast amount of private information in the cloud, 
such information currently only receives limited protection from 
unreasonable government intrusions. Existing statutes allow the 
government to obtain many private communications without a warrant 
and using a lower standard than the constitutional baseline of probable 
cause. Even with a warrant, inconsistent approaches to particularization 
fail to provide consistent protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. These intrusions into private communications are at least as 
invasive as the real-time wiretapping that Berger v. New York found was 
akin to a general warrant search—which the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to prohibit. 
To prevent unjustified and invasive general warrant seizures of private 
communications stored in the cloud, this Comment proposes an approach 
akin to Berger that accounts for the invasiveness of collecting large 
amounts of revealing information that can reach back years. A warrant 
based on probable cause should be a baseline requirement. Additionally, 
enhanced particularization of the warrant’s parameters should be required 
to ensure that the government cannot seize large amounts of 
nonresponsive information. Further, by establishing a protective 
constitutional backstop, this approach could provide an incentive for 
Congress to enact a modernized statutory framework that fully protects 
users’ privacy in the cloud. 
  
 
218. See supra notes 180–184 and accompanying text. 
